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Abstract 
 
This paper studies the effects of the crisis on democracy. Its methodology is based on a 
dialectic-materialist approach of ideology. Democracy is approached as a crucial ideological 
element in the legitimation of capitalist political economy. Molded by the social struggles, 
democracy evolved in an antagonistic relation with capitalism. Every hegemonic crisis affects 
the dominant meaning of democracy, creating divergent narratives about it. This is illustrated in 
the case of Portugal. Policymakers and the Troika still defend the dominant elitist 
representative democracy. Unions and the old left defend the necessity of social rights, as a 
substantive part of democracy. The newest social movements demand a participative and 
deliberative forms. The last section explores some possible hegemonic re-articulations. 
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Resumo 
 
Este artigo estuda os efeitos da crise sobre a democracia. A metodologia baseia-se numa 
aplicação do materialismo dialéctico na área da ideologia. Democracia é abordada como um 
elemento crucial na legitimação da economia política capitalista. Moldada pelas lutas sociais, a 
democracia co-evolui numa relação antagonista com o capitalismo. Cada crise hegemónica 
afecta o significado dominante da democracia, e tende criar narrativas divergentes dela. Isto é 
ilustrado no caso de Portugal. Os governantes e a Tróica  ainda defendem o discurso dominante 
da democracia representativa elitista. Os sindicatos e a “velha esquerda” defendem a 
necessidade dos direitos social como parte substantiva da democracia. Os novíssimos 
movimentos sociais defendem formas participativas e deliberativas. O ultima parte explora 
possíveis rearticulações hegemónicas. 
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Introduction 
This research paper studies the effects of the euro-crisis on the legitimacy of 
democracy. The crisis has provoked a widespread contestation of the European and 
Portuguese policies. While popular/national sovereignty is high-jacked by supra-
national technocratic policy-makers, wide protests took the streets “reclaiming” 
democracy. Consequently, the questions of democracy and austerity have become a 
very hot issue in public debate, both in academic circles, as in everyday conversations.  
Within the research field, the definition of democracy has become a very 
problematic. This methodological difficulty is the starting point for a deeper study into 
these questions of democracy and its link to the political economic crisis in which I 
abandon the idea of using a fixed concept of democracy, adopting an analysis that 
forces us to focus on the interaction of the crisis with the conceptualization of 
democracy itself. Democracy thus becomes a contested concept, not only within the 
academic democratic theory, but essentially as an ideological concept, a product of 
social struggles. 
 
Methodology 
Our radical approach to democratic ideology is based on the immanent critique of 
the (post-)Marxist interpretations of ideology, found in Althusser, Lukacs, Gramsci, 
Therborn and Zizek. Based on Karl Marx's key notions about ideology - such as (1) the 
dialectic and materialist analysis of infra and supra-structure of the political economy, 
(2) the assertion of the “ruling ideology as the ideology of the ruling class”, and (3) 
Marx’ approach to alienation and (4)  to the development of class-consciousness from 
“klasse an sich” to “klasse fur sich” - they approach ideology as the whole sphere of 
consciousness in which ideology is built upon a dialectical relation with praxis and 
political economy. (Therborn 1999, Althusser 1972, Zizek 2006) Ideology refers to how 
human beings live their life as conscious actors, making sense of things or situations 
through the interaction with other people; (Therborn 1999) in short it refers to the 
conscious and subconscious interaction with its material conditions. By no means 
should this approach of democracy thus be interpreted as idealistic - disregarding the 
practical forms, practices and relations as a dialectic materialist approach of democracy 
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considers the dialectic relation between sub- and superstructure of society, and 
between objective living conditions and human subjectivity.  
Approaching democracy “as ideology”, means to “focus on the way it operates in the 
formation and transformation of human subjectivity”. (Therborn, 1999: 2) Such an 
approach opposes mainstream political science and comparative politics approach. 
According to these approaches such as used in Lipset (1959), Huntington (1991), 
Przeworksi (1993), or more recently in “A qualidade da democracia em Portugal: a visão 
dos cidadãos” by Pinto et all (2013), democracy can just be taken as an empirical 
concept, with a fixed formal, often categorical definition of democracy. Democracy 
would thus be a state or situation that could be objectively defined and measured. 
Democracy is thus de-ideologized as a concept. Such a empirical, positivist approach is 
problematic given the well-known paradox about ideology within the academic 
literature – as defended by Slavoj Zizek, Göran Therborn, Eric Swyngedouw and others 
– that “the non-ideology” or “apolitical position”, is not only a hidden ideology, but 
that it is “the ideology” at its purest. The power of ideology achieves its highest point, 
the hegemonic position of an ideology, exactly when its subjects do not recognize it 
anymore as ideology, but as reality or truth. 
The arch-ideological position, dominant in empirical political science departs from a 
very idealistic formalistic approach of democracy. This becomes particularly clear in 
classical works of Huntington (1991) or Przeworski (1991) or more recently in the 
discussion about the different predictors for democracy and their relation of causality 
with “democracy”, such as in Pedro Magalhaes’ (2013) study of the relation between 
efficacy and democracy. Besides the ideological perspective hidden behind these 
positivistic approaches, the lack of a dialectical approach brings in errors of formal 
logic. As relations of causality cannot be proven, the so-called predictors are 
themselves potentially the product of the studied processes; and therefore unreliable, 
particularly in times of crisis which affect and transform their meanings. 
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Democracy 
Democracy as we know it, is a constitutive concept in the governance of modern 
societies
2
. In pre-modern European societies, feudal lords were not owners of the 
means of production, but were entitle to make use of the land based on allegiance, 
services to the their lord, military alliances and family-inheritance. The production-
system was based on small community-production and the extraction of surplus labor 
of the serfs which had to relay on the powers and means of the state (Santos, 1995). 
The legitimacy of governance structure was usually based on theological legitimation, 
family rights, bloodline and military force.(Therborn, 1999: 55-61) In modern societies 
however, the production-system changed and so did its base of legitimacy. Opposing 
the aristocratic ideology and reflecting the new organization of the market-economy; a 
new bourgeois ideology developed. Instead of blood-rights, inheritance and theological 
legitimation, rationality became the dominant epistemology, while social relations 
were legitimized based on free contracts/exchange/competition and efficiency. The 
idea of a sovereign ruling by the will of god was replaced by the idea of sovereignty of 
the people and democracy. 
Therborn (1977) identifies some tendencies that induced the democratic possibility 
of capitalism: Capitalism, at least in its initial phase, engenders (1) the establishment of 
centralized states and the necessity of national unification. At the same time, there is 
(2) a tendency towards internal competition within the ruling class, and (3) the 
impersonal role of exploitation involving rather the rule of capital than personal 
domination of the bourgeoisie, enables other classes to co-govern a capitalist state. 
Furthermore capitalism engenders (4) an inherent tendency of economic growth en 
technological development which creates room for temporary social compromises. 
These tendencies do not make democracy inherent to capitalism, however, nor 
makes is there a simple relation of complementarity. Instead bourgeois democracy and 
capitalism have most often an antagonistic relationship, similar to a dialectic unity. This 
antagonistic relation derives from the opposition between its important legitimizing 
function – which is based on the appearance that the governance is based on the will 
of the people – and the capitalist governance system it has to legitimize – which is 
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 This is - of course - not an exclusive relation, as also other historical moments and geographical 
places have had systems that were claimed to be democratic. 
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based upon the rule of capitalist accumulation in which social relations are structured 
by commodity fetishism. This antagonism led to the division between a public and a 
private sphere in capitalist societies; an ideological division between the political and 
the economy. In first instance this division was meant to keep the king or state out of 
the private affairs of the rising bourgeois class. (Habermas 1991) Since then - what we 
consider democracy today - changed as product of continuous struggles of social 
emancipation against capitalism. The Labour movement – itself the product of 
capitalist development - has been the major driving force for this in Western societies. 
(Therborn 1977) In the class-struggle between Bourgeoisie and Proletariat: bourgeois 
democracy and the division between public and private, took the role of restricting the 
influence of the upcoming politically organized working class. Its aim is directed to  the 
naturalization of capitalist economic exploitation in the private realm of civil society 
(Santos 1995: 414), while guaranteeing a truly constitutional public state, not the 
private legal possession of any specific group (santos 1995: 415).  Its struggle for social 
emancipation, particularly after the first world war - following a pre-war emancipatory 
movements and general strikes,  in an environment of social turmoil following the 
human and social  disaster of the war, and particularly after its first consequences 
emerged during the Russian Revolution in 1917 – has been directed in a 
institutionalization of political democracy. The economic and political elites in western-
Europe quickly went over to the implementation of universal (men) voting rights in 
parliamentary elections in order to co-opt the leadership of the organized proletariat. 
This process gives the purely formal democracy a substance through an extension of 
democratic participation and the establishment of social rights and the social welfare 
state. 
 
Democratic legitimacy 
Legitimacy is the notion of “the right to govern”. (Bodansky 1999) It always rests on 
the shared acceptance of rules and rule by affected communities and on justificatory 
norms recognized by the relevant community. As such, it is founded in a collective 
audience’s shared belief, that ‘the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or 
appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and 
definitions.’ (Bernstein 2004) It is part of an ideological construction, that “the existing 
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political organization is the most appropriate” and makes existing power-relations 
acceptable. (Lipset 1959) While earlier generations of scholars viewed legitimacy as 
functional for making rulers ‘more secure in the possession of power and more 
successful in its exercise’, more critical authors also focus on how legitimacy justifies 
authority and domination, and can thus also be a source of power, enabling some 
policies or practices while proscribing others. (Bernstein 2004) 
Traditionally, there are 2 approaches to legitimacy. The normative approach, is an 
evaluation made on the basis of moral grounds (Buchanan & Keohane 2006), and refers 
to whether a claim of authority is justified in some objective sense. (Bodansky 1999) 
The sociological approach - or “popular legitimacy” approach in the litterature - , 
considers the public’s attitudes about the institution as a source of rules. Legitimacy is 
thus dependent on the practical attitude and is thus as an empirical phenomenon. 
(Buchanan & Keohane 2006) Here also, a dialectical materialist approach enables us to 
understand this apparent opposition. A dialectical relation exists between the material, 
empirical dimension of legitimacy on one hand and an ideal, moral dimension on the 
other hand. Together they form a dialectical unity, as a sociologic, empirical movement 
questioning the existing order can only exist if it projects alternative forms of 
legitimacy to mobilize discontent. At the same time, moral grounds for legitimacy, do 
not exist by themselves and are constructed within the empirical material struggle, 
depending on established or changing conditions. From a dialectic materialist 
perspective, the opposition between both is crucial, because it is this antagonism  
which creates the necessary space for political agency at the center of legitimacy, and 
thus a source for social change. 
When we consider democracy as a base for legitimacy; the empirical existence of 
democratic legitimacy is thus dependent on the social consensus about what 
democracy “is” or “should be”. This implies a democratic hegemony, and thus that 
there is a power, or Gramscian-style power-coalition, which sustains a hegemonic 
interpretation and institutionalization of democracy. Therefore we can look towards 
the previously discussed historical antagonist co-evolution of Western European 
democratization with capitalism as a sequence of different power-coalitions and 
configurations based on compromises between the working class, peasants, internal 
fractions of the bourgeoisie and other groups in society. (Therborn 1977)  
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In recent decades, the social consensus in Europe was based upon the Washington-
consensus. With the collapse of “real socialism”, the main alternative for capitalism 
disappeared ; leading to neoliberal hegemony and Fukuyama’s (1992) “End of History”. 
In what Huntingtons’ (1991) called the “third wave”, democracy hegemonized as 
governance principle but paradoxically reduced it to “low-intensity democracy” (Gills et 
all 1993, Santos 2003). Neoliberal ideology sustains a perspective that a society is most 
efficient when based on market-efficiency and competition. (Brown 2011) In such a 
new “post-political” (Swyngedouw 2007) or “post-democratic” world, management 
took the place of politics (Ranciere, 1998); democratic power was restricted through 
neoliberal policies and globalization. Neoliberal hegemony assumes liberal democratic 
capitalism as the end of human evolution. It serves as the base for the hegemonic 
interpretation of democracy today, the elitist liberal model (Santos 2012). Based on 
Schumpeter’s’(1942) model, it restricts democracy to the electoral choice between 
elites, within ever more restricted public sphere 
Although democratic participation declined (Santos 2005), neoliberal ideology so far 
remained uncontested; meaning that the liberal-democratic elitist procedural 
legitimation sufficed. The current “state of democratic theory” (Shapiro 2006) reflects 
this. We find a liberal kernel in all dominant schools; not only in democratic elitism of 
Shumpeter (1942) and Przeworski (1999) and positivist empiricism as in Huntington 
(1993) and Pinto (2013), but also in the the critical deliberativism such as Benhabib 
(1996) and Habermas (1998) and even in the radical and agonistic schools such as in 
early Zizek, Butler(2000), Mouffe and Laclau (1985). Even Sousa Santos (2009) admits 
his concept “democratizing democracy” represents an answer to the lack of 
alternatives to capitalist globalization. While criticizing the liberal approach, they 
generally don’t go to the end; with the detachment of democracy from the 
organization of the political economy; democratic theory restricts itself to idealist 
models and pragmatism. 
 
Semi-peripheral democracy 
Although the liberal model achieved nearly universal characteristics, in its peripheral 
regions, the question of its particular application becomes more complex. In 
dependent capitalist nations, the internal dynamics of the ruling class are largely 
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dependent on an external center. The economic base is extremely fragile and 
vulnerable to international crisis; this reduces the room for maneuver and social 
compromise on which modern western democracy is built. The dependence on 
external economic interests hinders the development of impersonal rule. Their 
peripheral position during the age of industrialization limited the development of a 
modern industrial economy, and with it the growth of the organized labour movement. 
All these factors have been crucial in the development of democracy in the core. 
(Therborn 1977) 
The consequence has been a very dubious relation between the Portuguese ruling 
class and the national state and consequently to national democracy. Sousa Santos 
(2012) defends that for one - internationalized - fraction the national state is too small.  
It looks abroad for export-markets, partners and investment opportunities. It pushed 
Portugal towards European integration after the loss of the colonial empire, as Europe 
meant a “solution” for the role it was never able to develop. (Santos 2012) Europe 
should have been an incentive to reform the judicial system, to regulate corruption, 
develop national infrastructure and enable Portugal, to enter the Globalized world on a 
stronger basis. The other fraction was just too underdeveloped and localized to have 
any dominant influence on public policies. It had to retract to corruption and fiscal 
evasion as a dominant political strategy towards the state. (Santos 2012 :61) These 
para-statal informal power structures and networks of corruption and nepotism – 
which served as an alternative for the bourgeois centralized state (Ruivo 2000) - 
undermine the project for a liberal-democratic Rechtsstaat. 
As a symbolic contrast with the Estado Novo dictatorship, democracy nevertheless 
occupied a particular position in the trans-class consensus after the revolutionary 
period. Key for this consensus about democracy was a compromise based upon the 
“ideas of the revolution” and “Europe”. The revolution echoed social justice and 
equality, and institutionalized in the late development of a – feeble - welfare state with 
social rights including free education and a universal healthcare system. (Santos 2012) 
“Europe” meant the perspective of economic and technological development, the 
promise of accessing “civilization”, and opening of new markets for the elites, as well as 
an escape from the internal economic and social conflicts of the PREC through supra-
national governance and subsidies.(Lobo 2003, 2011, Santos 2012) 
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Democracy and Crisis 
As long as power-relations didn’t change, there was no breaking up of the consensus 
which sustains the dominant hegemony. Here the dynamics of the political economy 
are crucial. The current crisis in Portugal - consequence of the complex dynamics 
behind the global financial crisis and the internal imbalances within the European 
capitalist unification resulting in the Eurocrisis – has brought an end to the Portuguese 
consensus about democracy (as it has done in other peripheral countries).3 The 
concept of crisis is crucial here. Crisis refers to an internal contradiction within the 
system itself, as if it would be a dysfunction of an organism. (Habermas 1975) It is not 
primarily an external condition, but the consequence of a qualitative change within the 
system itself, based on a historical quantitative accumulative process. The imbalances 
in the euro-area and the unsustainability of the public and private debt are the 
consequence of a long process of neoliberal economic and monetary unification and 
capitalist globalization. These led to a deterioration of the national economy, debt-
fueled growth and ultimately to a loss of sovereignty to financial capitalism. 
Just as the political-economic processes that led to it, the divergence of ideas about 
democracy is not really a new situation. The perceived loss of sovereignty is only a 
accumulation of a long-term process of transfer of decision making authorities to the 
supra-national level. (Verney and Bosco, 2012) In the same way, different narratives 
about democracy have their predecessors. Portuguese citizens already had a high 
distrust in the political elite before the crisis, (Santos 2012) and this fact is exemplified 
by previous high rates of non-participation and abstention during elections, etc. (Pinto 
et all, 2013) Moreover, many of the narratives we found are built upon collective 
memories of past social struggles and established forms of organization. 
The electoral system has been one of the “transfer-mechanisms” (Habermas 1975) 
through which the crisis manifested itself on the level of democracy. Electorally, the 
cost of the crisis for parties from incumbent governments has been very high in all 
peripheral economies. (Verney and Bosco 2012, Bellucci, Lobo & Lewis-Beck 2012) The 
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 The crisis is the consequence of an interplay between dynamics of geographical uneven 
development (Hadjimichalis 2011), neoliberal financial deregulation, the consequences of monetary 
unification in a non-optimal currency-area (De Grauwe 2010) and has been deepened by the austerity-
policies themselves (Krugman 2012). 
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deepening crisis of the euro-crisis led to the downfall of Greek, Italian, Spanish and 
Portuguese Governments. However, a number of interrelated factors made that the 
electoral system as such could not uphold legitimacy, and to contain it. The main factor 
was certainly the depth and length of the crisis that continued over different elections, 
“burning” both the governmental parties as their previously official oppositions. This 
happened in Portugal, where the PS-government was ousted in the 2011 elections, but 
the PSD has since then also lost most its legitimacy. Generally, the crisis thus led to a 
decay in electoral legitimacy, with a “growth of abstention, increasing parliamentary 
fragmentation and the emergence of new political forces, notably those expressing 
anti-party, extreme right-wing or even racist positions” with a “tendency towards the 
bypassing of political parties as a means of political participation”.(Verney and Bosco, 
2012) To avoid these developments, in some countries such as in Greece and Italy, 
elections were even considered a luxury country couldn’t afford. (Verney and Bosco, 
2012). 
 
Divergent Democratic discourses today 
The contradictions in the economy have put a huge pressure on the democratic 
consensus in Portugal, and consequently the crisis has reflected itself into the 
democratic ideology, particularly into a hegemonic crisis of democracy. As a result of 
the crisis the liberal elitist democratic hegemony disrupts into the emergence of a 
range of different – often contradicting - narratives reflecting different historical 
backgrounds and social positions. The result of such a hegemonic crisis is  what 
Boaventura Sousa Santos (2007: lxiii) would call a demo-diversity; “the peaceful or 
conflicting coexistence [...] of different models and practices of democracy”4. While the 
governing elite  - based on the liberal elitist interpretation of democracy - still considers 
itself as the only legitimate elected representatives of the people, the personification 
                                                           
4
 This concept was inspired by the initial ideological struggle about the meaning of democracy 
involved continuous processes of reinterpretation in the Portuguese post-revolutionary period. (Soutelo 
2012) He develops this concept as a historical description, but also as a means of emancipation, an 
inspiration of alternatives against the situation of liberal hegemony he calls a “democratic 
monoculture”. I question the utility of using both “peaceful or conflicting coexistence”, as between 
“peacefull” and “conflictual” there is a dialectic relation, having different temporalities that are not 
clarified in the term, and thus reflect different political meanings. But critique of the concept of demo-
diversity will be presented in a future version of this work. 
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of democracy and reason, this is disputed by ever larger layers of the population during 
the protests. 
Crucial is how it interacted with the ideas of “Europe” and “the revolution”. Once 
the two concepts stood for the consensus about democracy. Today’s 
incommensurability between both symbolizes the emerged dissensus. For the ruling 
class, Europe still means civilization, financial and economic salvation, and necessary 
technical reforms,- that serve as the base for any democratic society. Protestors, 
however see it as undemocratic, unjust, capital-oriented, core-dominated and equalize 
it with a foreign occupation. A similar thing happens to the “ideas of the revolution”. Its 
constitution and social rights are seen by the democratically elected government as 
unsustainable; a threat to the Portuguese economy. Its application by the 
constitutional court is degraded as “political activism”. For the opponents of austerity 
“the conquests of the revolution” are a safeguard against the illegitimate government 
policies. The revolution represents the rights which are taken away, it represent the 
resistance against “authoritarian rule” of a “privileged elite”. This tension between 
“Europe” and the “revolution” reflects the tension between so-called “responsiveness” 
and “responsibility”, between voters’ demands and the constraints of government 
management imposed by the crisis, which is found in scientific explanations of the  
governance crisis (Verney and Bosco 2012, p 151). As all sides of the conflict still claim 
to uphold democracy, the dissensus is projected into differing interpretations of the 
concept of democracy itself.  
We mainly observe these divergences between policymakers and protestors. The 
governing elite and the Troika still reflects the old liberal narrative: the crisis has led to 
some pressure on the political body but the government has all the democratic 
legitimacy to implement the measures it deems necessary, as elections have provided 
it with a parliamentary majority. What happened after these elections is not taken into 
consideration, not even the role of future elections remains as a form of accountability. 
In this context, Pedro Passos Coelho (Publico 2012), the Portuguese Prime minister 
even stated “Fuck elections, what matters is Portugal”. Appealing to the values of “stat-
responsibility” affirming that the members of parliament are “not elected to win 
elections”. Any alternative policy is considered as irresponsible as the policy-measures 
are highly conditioned by the international framework and a technocratic governance, 
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necessary to reclaim some sovereignty in the future. A representative of the Troika 
(2013) affirmed that “protests are good because the show the existent vitality of 
democracy”, however they only represent a parliamentary minority. This protesting 
minority should be granted the liberal freedom of expression, but not more than that. 
Consequently protests have to be peaceful and symbolic; whereas it is implied that 
they will not change anything in the necessary reforms. 
When asked about their perspective on the state of democracy, protestors on the 
other hand generally draw a very dark picture: Generally the judgment is that 
democracy disappeared or is in very bad condition. Commonly recorded arguments to 
prove the veracity of this judgment are attributed to a loss of sovereignty, corruption, 
loss of social rights, lack of popular support for government policies, lies in the 
electoral program, etc. This comes together with a general lack of confidence in 
political parties and in the parliamentary system as such. 
But the divergences do not only manifest themselves between protestors and 
policymakers. The hegemonic breakdown and the emptying of Democracy as the 
Master-signifier have also led to the manifestation of other divergences which are 
addressed in terms of democracy. We see a part of the right, members of the governing 
parties and the economic elite aligning with the protestors arguments and questioning 
the legitimacy of the government, given the loss of national sovereignty and the effects 
of the neoliberal policies on the internal markets. 
Also within the protestors movements we can observe divergences. Within the 
Indignado movement Classic divides emerged such as ‘conflict versus compromise’ in 
decision making, and thus about voting procedures or deciding by consensus. There 
existed disagreements about the establishment of more permanent structures in the 
meetings or not, the possibility of having representatives or spokesmen, the agreement 
of topic-specific working groups, the time-limits of deliberation, the acceptance of 
organized groups within the debates, etc… While the common effects of the Global 
character of the financial crisis and the Euro-crisis strengthened cosmopolitan 
international solidarities, such as the initiatives around “Global Spring”, at the same 
time the external interventions strengthened the more nationalist appeal of national 
sovereignty in other layers. The divergence is even wider if we compare with the 
perspectives of other oppositional groups, organizations and parties which were not 
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active in the acampada movement or quitted the acampadas during the debates due to 
what some called “unworkability”, “lack of freedom of organization” or even 
“undemocratic methods”. 
 
New struggles for Hegemony 
These last paragraphs of this research paper, are dedicated to some reflections that 
go beyond the divergence of democratic narratives, but also address some possible 
convergences. From a Marxist perspective, every socio-political struggle is a dialectical 
interaction between practice and ideas, between change of material conditions and 
ideology,  between an empirical dimension of mobilization and a moral dimension of 
judgement. Consequently the search for political change among the protest 
movements against austerity and the social consequences of the crisis is also search for 
alternative forms of democratic legitimation. As, protestor try to justify their struggles 
in an effort to mobilize themselves, there struggle involves a search for new narratives 
or signifiers. This process is the process of judgement; a reflection that constructs a 
bridge between worsening material condition and an ideological narrative that explains 
“why the situation is bad and we need to mobilize, in order to be able to change“. 
The process of protest is a process of joint actions, in which co-construct activists, 
groups and organizations narratives. It integrates conscious and unconscious 
“discursive coalition” formations through the struggles. Political struggles have the aim 
to establish their particular judgments as universalities. One could characterize these 
attempts of hegemonic re-articulations - such as described by Gramsci (2011). Here I 
will shortly discuss three examples of such possible re-articulations that we can find in 
the Portuguese context: socio-economic articulation, anti-political articulation, and the 
nationalist discourse. There is, however, no clear distinction between the previously 
discussed divergence and these re-articulations. More-over, these re-articulations, 
discursive coalitions, transgress classes and identities; which makes that there don’t 
exist clear dividing lines between them, the division is a mere categorization for 
analysis. 
The first narrative addresses what orthodox Marxism would consider class 
consciousness; the transformation from specific social conditions in the mode of 
productions (Klasse an sich) to a political mobilization around this identity (Klasse fur 
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sich). This narrative frames the problem for democracy as a socio-economic problem 
and has been very visible since the very beginning of the crisis. It is reflected in the 
mobilizations of trade unions, new social movements and the left mobilizing against 
attacks on living conditions, against cuts in public services against impoverishment and 
unemployment. The narrative blames the capitalist structure and the pro-capitalist 
oriented policies for the social conditions of the crisis. It is within this narrative that we 
should categorize slogans such as “We will not pay their crisis”, “we are the 99%”, 
“international solidarity among the PIIGS”, etc… This narrative claims to be defending 
democracy on the base of its substance, by defending social rights, social justice against 
the domination of a small economic elite and “the financial markets”. It claims that the 
dominant narrative – of the policymakers –   is undemocratic, as the influence of the 
financial markets and European technocracy restricts or even annihilates political 
choice.   
More radical layers however, the indignados and acampada movement in particular, 
started from the same condition but radicalized the revolt.  Demanding “Democracia 
real já” (real democracy now!) they confronted the existent institutionalization of 
democracy. This “real democracy” reflected broad oppositions against the limits of 
liberal representative democracy. There seemed to be a consensus on the necessary 
extension – or at least a status quo - of substantive and procedural dimensions of 
democracy - Gills et all (1993) and Sousa Santos and Avritzer (2005) would call it a 
more “high intensity democracy” contrasting with its (neo)liberal-democratic “low-
intensity” form. A part of the opposition, however concentrated primarily on the 
question of representativeness as a form, and thus depolicized the issue.  
The consequence is that the revolt came to be canalized in a narrative which went 
from oppositions against the existing representative system to opposition of “political 
party” and even a condemnation of “the political” as such. This narrative, gaining a 
wide representation in society, - particularly voiced among indignado’s, anarchists and 
populists parties - frames "politicians", “the political system” or politics in general as 
corrupt and bad. The problem of democracy would be a problem of the predominance 
of personal and collective “interests” by corrupt politicians and businessmen over the 
common good. As an alternative; real democracy should be based on policies 
consensus and general interest. 
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Strangely, this kind of a narrative among the protestor opens a window for another 
kind of depoliticized or anti-politicized articulation with the other side of the socio-
economic conflict. Ironically a big part of its discourse perfectly fits with the dominant 
neoliberal depoliticized ideology; which blames the crisis of mismanagement and 
corruption of the political cast.5
 
 
A third more recent re-articulation seems to occur along the lines of a nationalist 
rhetoric. This narrative links the problems of democracy and the crisis-situation to the 
question of the Euro. According to this narrative, it is the Euro-project which caused 
the crisis. Democracy is endangered by the policies to maintain  the currency, resulting 
in a lack of political choices en a lack of national sovereignty.  Since the beginning, such 
a line of thought has been part of the repertoire of the PCP, recently it was reflected in 
their campaign for “a patriotic and left government”. Other players have also adopted 
part of this nationalist narrative. Among the radical left they include the MAS 
(Movimento Alternativa Socialista) which campaigns for a referendum on the euro-exit. 
In their statement “Portugal should fight to recover its political sovereignty“, their 
president Gil Garcia(2014) claims:  “Portugal, the oldest independent nation of Europe, 
is every time less and less master of its own strategic decisions. Because of this, and 
because the counterparts to remain in the euro and the EU are blackmail and 
permanent cuts (through debt) in salaries and pensions of millions of workers, 
particularly  in half a million civil servants (sic)”. Lately it was also found in the “Political 
guide for the European [elections]”, a manifesto by Alexandre Abreu, João Rodrigues e 
Nuno Teles (2013) in which they defend a euro-exit and sovereign monetary policy as 
an exit of the crisis. 
 
Conclusions 
The dialectic materialist analysis showed that the economic crisis is reflected in 
emerging contradictions in the narratives about democracy. These narratives range 
from the formal elitist perspective of the policymakers to a purely substantive view on 
the side of the trade unions, while the acampada movement expressed wide range of 
models and deliberative practices. The lack of consensus about the meaning of 
democracy because of lack of social consensus explains in part the problem of the 
                                                           
5
 A more extensive argument will be developed in my book-chapter of “Beyond Indignados”, 2014 
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legitimacy of democracy in Southern Europe. A common element of all narratives 
however, is that they all defended their perspectives within the democratic framework. 
It provides an explanation for the reason why there are institutions considered to be 
democratic by one of the sides of the conflict while at the same time, anti-democratic 
by another, providing a level of legitimacy to the possibility that it may be overthrown 
or neglected. It can help to explain how democracy can become obsolete in spite of 
public convictions they defend democracy. 
Zizek’s (2006: 37) Parallax view on democracy  proposes that today’s “struggle for 
democracy […] is in what it will mean”. In the last part of this article we discussed three 
narratives, or signifiers that in their struggle give a different particular content to the 
Democratic, empty Master-signifier: the socio-economic, the anti-political and the 
nationalist. It will depend on the future struggles, which (combinations) of these 
narratives will guide the future of democracy in Portugal. 
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